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THE EFFECTS OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINTS
Aibak Hafeez1
ABSTRACT
This paper examines how the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 2008-09 influenced the
usage and outcomes of discrimination arbitration cases for employee plaintiffs in the securities
industry. It casts light on whether arbitration is able to serve as an appropriate and preferable
workplace dispute resolution system during a macroeconomic crisis when aggrieved employees
are most vulnerable and financially powerless. Macroeconomic recessionary periods are
characterized with an increase in employment discrimination claims. As the labor market
becomes slack during an economic recession, it becomes easier for firms to indulge in
discriminatory behavior. In such a scenario, employee-plaintiffs desire an inexpensive,
faster, and efficient dispute resolution process. As arbitration is characterized to have all these
features, it can be expected that if given the option to choose between arbitration and litigation,
employee-claimants would lean towards arbitration. Using the securities industry data from
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), this paper examines whether this is what
happens in practicality. The financial industry serves as an ideal means of conducting this
analysis because disputants have the option to mutually choose between arbitration and
litigation to resolve their discrimination cases. The paper also examines how the outcomes of
discrimination arbitration cases varied during the recession. Results are interpreted to answer
questions regarding whether arbitration cases rise during a recession; what happens to
arbitrations’ employee win rate during a recession; does arbitration provide higher or lower
compensatory award amounts during a recessionary period? All these questions are important
and valuable in terms of assessing whether arbitration is a viable and preferable option for
employee-plaintiffs during an economic crisis, a time when claimants need justice the most.
Undesirable findings related to arbitration may just serve as another ammunition for opponents
of arbitration. Adverse results would be consequential for those who want to continue
expanding arbitration access at the expense of the court system.
1.

INTRODUCTION

Like other areas of industrial relations and human resource practices, arbitration as an
employment dispute resolution platform is also influenced by contextual factors. Changes in
the legal environment like the litigation explosion starting in the 1960s, union substitution, and
courts’ deference to arbitration, are some of the external pressures that have impacted the use
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of arbitration.2 Studies conducted on these factors have helped scholars unfold the nature of
employment arbitration.3 For example, following the courts deferral to employment arbitration
agreements after the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp,4 researchers were able to examine whether arbitration is an adequate forum to resolve
employment disputes involving statutory claims5. This paper analyzes how another contextual
factor, a macro-level economic recession, influences employment arbitration and how
arbitration performs under such a constraint.
Specifically, this study examines the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)
2008-09 on the usage and outcomes of discrimination claims arbitrated by employees in the
securities industry. In doing so, the paper contributes to understanding the nature of
employment arbitration: does arbitration serve as a preferable and fruitful forum to obtain
justice when the economy is hit by a macroeconomic crisis? This question is specifically
important because when a recession occurs, victims of discrimination mostly lose their jobs and
become financially and emotionally vulnerable.6 In such a scenario, disputant parties look for
relatively inexpensive, faster, and efficient mediums of justice. 7 As arbitration is known to have
all these qualities, it makes theoretical sense for parties to prefer arbitrating their discrimination
complaints during a recession. However, it is also known that arbitration is characterized with
lower win rates and award amounts for employees bringing in their discrimination cases. 8 Given
these pros and cons of arbitration, and provided disputant parties are allowed to choose between
arbitration and litigation, does arbitration serve as the better choice? During a recessionary
economy, provided firms decide to choose arbitration, is arbitration able to attract employee
plaintiffs because of its’ low cost and efficiency, or do employees prefer to take their disputes
into litigation to gain a potentially higher return?
An understanding of the difference in usage of arbitration and litigation during a
recession will provide an understanding of whether arbitration is able to provide the standards
of fairness that the court system is able to offer during a weak economy. This topic is
particularly valid today when COVID-19 is presenting yet another economically unstable and
uncertain period. Additionally, with more and more employees using arbitration to resolve their
disputes, it seems important to understand whether arbitration has the ability to protect
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aggrieved employees during a time when they are most vulnerable, i.e., a macro-financial crisis.
A failure to provide justice akin to what the courts provide may have significant consequences
for the sustenance and growth of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution system.
The data analyzed in this paper consists of the universe of arbitration discrimination
claims filed by employees against their securities firms between 1999-2017. All these cases are
closed cases which have been resolved via Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
who administers the securities firms’ dispute resolution system. The securities industry serves
as an ideal means for conducting this analysis because it uses voluntary arbitration to resolve
discrimination claims – parties have the option to collectively decide and take their
discrimination claims to courts or to an arbitration system. This policy helps in gaining a
meaningful interpretation of the results as it allows for a direct examination of whether
disputants prefer to use arbitration when they have the option of litigation as well. This would
not have been possible if mandatory arbitration were the policy being implemented. To compare
arbitration and litigation caseloads during the GFC, Bloomberg Law is used to source litigation
data that comprises discrimination lawsuits filed by securities employees. These comparative
changes in caseloads are presumed to reflect disputant parties’ perceptions and proclivity
towards arbitration in a weak economy. Considering defendant-firms are generally more
inclined to use arbitration as they have more control and have higher chances of winning, 9 an
agreement to use arbitration in a voluntary system (where both parties need to agree to arbitrate)
can be attributed to employees’ preferences to arbitrate.
Other than usage, this paper also analyzes how arbitration performs during an
economic recession. The arbitration data includes information on case characteristics as well as
outcomes. Using these data, a regression framework is used to examine how the employee win
rate and award amounts changed within discrimination arbitration cases during and after the
GFC period. Prior literature on employee win rate and award amounts for litigation
discrimination cases shows that during a recession, employee plaintiffs who win their claims
receive higher award amounts, but the overall win rate decreases. 10. This mechanism, known
as the Worker Benefits Effect, is primarily a function of litigation taking more time to resolve
cases: employee-plaintiffs claiming discrimination charges are mostly jobless and remain
jobless for longer periods of time when the economy and labor market is down. The longer
unemployment period, coupled with the fact that litigation takes a long time to resolve a case,
increases the backpay awarded to successful plaintiffs. This prospect of higher backpay attracts
many aggrieved employees whose claims are less meritorious, which lowers the employee win
rate.11 Using this theory, the paper tests whether arbitration functions similarly or does it
perform otherwise because of its distinct features. Findings are expected to provide an
understanding of whether arbitration is able to offer remedies during a recessionary economy
that are as effective as the court system. A lacking in this respect can adversely influence the
already controversial image of employment arbitration and its expansion as an alternative
workplace dispute resolution system.

9

Colvin, supra note 5, at 17–18.
John J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over
the Business Cycle, 66(2) S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 712–13 (1993).
11
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2.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 Arbitration usage

To theorize how a macroeconomic recession impacts the usage of employment
arbitration to resolve discrimination claims, it is imperative to understand how employment
discrimination is generally affected during a macro-level financial crisis. The relationship
between a recession and discriminatory behavior can be explained using Becker’s theory of
discrimination.12 Becker posited that when the labor market is in a good shape, discrimination
practiced by employers is costly and unsustainable. However, in the presence of market
frictions like economic recessions, employers are able to indulge in discrimination at lower
costs because the labor market becomes slack and the competition for workers declines. 13
According to Haider and Plancich, this is exactly why the financial crisis of 2008 met with an
increase in employment discrimination lawsuits from 8.8% in the fiscal year 2007 to 12.6% in
200814.
Becker’s discrimination theory is primarily supported by studies that show an increase
in the number of discrimination lawsuits after a recession occurs. However, it is not necessary
that caseloads rise only because employers indulge in more discriminatory practices. A
conflicting argument and a pushback to Becker’s discrimination theory may be that cases rise
because more aggrieved and jobless employees decide to file their claims after the economy
goes downhill. Although this is a plausible possibility, it is difficult to ascertain. 15 Bornstein
endorsed Becker’s theory by theoretically explaining how economic inequality increased
during the 2008 recession, but she also clarified that the increase in discrimination lawsuits may
just be a function of more employees filing their claims during their joblessness in a
recessionary labor market16. She described how employees are more likely to file a
discrimination lawsuit when the labor market is depressed and when it is hard to find new jobs.
After explaining both sides of the story, she concluded that regardless of whether discrimination
increased, discrimination lawsuits filed (whether meritorious or not) certainly increased during
the GFC. Griffin supported this notion by empirically showing that during recessionary periods,
irrespective of whether discrimination increases or not, employees tend to file more
discrimination lawsuits17. He explained that the primary cause of this effect is aggrieved
employees’ anticipation of receiving compensatory awards during their joblessness in an
already depressed labor market. Griffin went on to allude that employees sometimes use the
12

See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2nd ed. 1971).
Orley Ashenfelter, Changes in Labor Market Discrimination over Time, 5(4) J. HUM. RES. 403, 421 (1970);
Stijn Baert, Bart Cockx, Niels Gheyle, & Cora Vandamme, Is There Less Discrimination in Occupations Where
Recruitment is Difficult?, 68 ILR Rev. 1, 3 (2015); Matthew Keppner, When the Shadow is the Substance: Judge
Gender and the Outcomes of Workplace Sex Discrimination Cases, 36(3) J. LAB. & ECON. 623 (2018); Gordon
B. Dahl & Matthew Knepper, Age Discrimination Across the Business Cycle (CESifo Working Paper No. 8451),
https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2020/working-paper/age-discrimination-across-business-cycle
(last
visited Jan. 5, 2022).
14
Laila Haider & Stephanie Plancich, Damage Estimation in Wrongful Termination Cases: Impact of the Great
Recession, NERA Econ. Consulting, 1 (2012).
15
Bornstein, supra note 6, at 122.
16
Id. at 132.
17
Christopher L. Griffin, Explaining ADA Employment Discrimination Charges Over the Business Cycle, 84(3)
U. CIN. L. REV. 737, 768–69 (2018).
13
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employment discrimination law as an informal unemployment insurance mechanism during
recessions. This raises the question that is arbitration also used as a vehicle for such an insurance
when the economy goes down? Do discrimination cases rise for arbitration as well?
Employment arbitration cases, in general, are known to increase during recessions.
Lipsky briefly touched upon the issue and cited the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) reporting a combined increase of 54% in their customer and employment arbitration
filings between 2007 and 2008.18 However, these employment filings mostly included nonstatutory and non-discrimination allegations.19
To address this question and develop hypothesis, it is important to delve into the
characteristics of employment arbitration. Arbitration is inherently different compared to other
conflict resolution platforms such as mediation and factfinding. Arbitration systems are
commonly part of an internal grievance process – this process gives parties a systematic
opportunity to settle their disputes in non-binding and more amicable platforms (i.e.,
mediation).20 The securities industry’s arbitration system also allows the use of mediation
before a case is escalated to an arbitration hearing. Therefore, many of the disputes are settled
via internal grievance procedures operating prior to arbitration at earlier stages of the conflict.
This dynamic is likely to function at a greater strength for parties who are inclined to use ADR
and arbitration, especially when the economy is down. During recessionary periods, cost
conscious firms are also known to make extra efforts to settle their disputes; they do this to
strategically avoid the risk of losing or paying potentially higher damages if the dispute is
escalated to binding arbitration.21 Therefore, it can be expected that after a recession occurs,
many of the discrimination cases are settled at earlier stages of the conflict which then lowers
arbitration caseloads.
Another major reason to expect arbitration cases to decline is selection effect.
Discrimination cases that do not get settled and reach a point where parties must decide between
arbitration and litigation, are cases that have high merit and high expected returns. Such cases,
as Schwartz explains, should be litigated because courts generally award high awards (for
employees) and use higher levels of discovery which goes in favor of defendant firms, provided
they have a strong case22.
Employees may also be afraid to lose their cases. The burden of proof in a
discrimination case is on employee-plaintiffs,23 and establishing damages can be a difficult task,
especially if the labor market is enveloped by a recession24. In such circumstances, employees’
propensity towards filing discrimination claims would decrease because they would be afraid
that firms might use the economic recession as a natural defense mechanism. Donohue and
Siegelman explain how most terminations during economic slumps are recession-induced, and
firms sometimes get away with making the argument that they terminated the employee-

18

Lipsky, supra note 7, at 1.
Lamara & Lipsky, supra note 5, at 159.
20
Colvin, supra note 3, at 712.
21
See generally Barry Leon, Dispute Resolution in the Recession, THE LAWYER’S WEEKLY (Feb. 13, 2009).
22
David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84(3) NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247, 1309–10 (2009).
23
D. R. NOLAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL (3rd ed. 2017).
24
Russell Penzer & Maryam Parvaneh, Effective of Recession of Damage Awards in Employment Cases, 245(84)
N.Y. L. J. 1 (2011).
19
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plaintiff due to the recession, not discrimination25. Therefore, only the most egregious
discrimination complaints would be filed during a recession, and such cases as mentioned
above, yield a more fruitful outcome in litigation.
There is also evidence that suggests that employees avoid filing claims after a
recession occurs.26 Donohue and Siegelman describe that the volume of litigation lawsuits, but
not Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charges of discrimination, rise during
a recession27. Aggrieved workers do not initiate new complaints with the EEOC (which is the
first step in filing a discrimination lawsuit) when the economy turns downward – it is the
employees who have already initiated administrative proceedings in the EEOC that decide to
go ahead and pursue litigation. In other words, the litigation cases rise during a recession only
because a significantly larger percentage of employees who already have their cases filed in the
EEOC get the motivation to take their cases to courts when the economy turns downward.
People avoid filing new claims with the EEOC – especially incumbent employees who still
have their jobs and are afraid of retaliation or loss of job. In an arbitration system however, a
dispute does not have to be approved by an EEOC-like body; a claim can be directly filed into
arbitration. Therefore, the decline in number of cases filed with the EEOC as the first step in
litigation can analogically be used to expect arbitration cases to decline as well.
Keeping all the arguments presented above in mind, it is hypothesized that after the
GFC 2008 struck the U.S. economy, arbitration met with a decrease in discrimination claims
filed by employees, whereas litigation discrimination cases rose in number.
2.2 Arbitration outcomes
Variations in arbitration outcomes during the GFC are also examined. Empirical
research regarding employment arbitration has shown that arbitrated discrimination cases
generally produce comparatively unfavorable outcomes for employee plaintiffs. 28 In order to
add a new strand to this remarkable cohort of studies, this paper examines how outcomes vary
under a macroeconomic recessionary constraint. Findings will provide a deeper understanding
on whether arbitration serves as a fair and employee-friendly forum to resolve discrimination
claims when macroeconomic conditions and the labor market are unfriendly. An understanding
of whether arbitration produces favorable outcomes during weak economies can provide further
knowledge regarding its worth as an alternative dispute resolution system. Better outcomes may
suggest that its distinct features of being quick and inexpensive are especially useful during
recessions and that employees should lean towards using it during a recession, and vice versa.
To analyze the relationship between an economic recession and the outcomes of
discrimination claims filed in arbitration, the Worker Effects theory is borrowed from Donohue
and Siegelman.29 Donohue and Siegelman examined the effects of economic recession on
discrimination awards in the legal context. Using econometric equations, they theorized that
during macroeconomic crises, the award amounts received by victorious employee plaintiffs
25

Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 752.
See Hartford Reports Drop in Bias Complaints, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992.
27
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 711.
28
Colvin, supra note 5; Colvin & Pike, supra note 5; Gough, supra note 5; Lamare & Lipsky, supra note 5; Mark
Gough, A Tale of Two Forums: Employment Discrimination Outcomes in Arbitration and Litigation, 74(4) ILR
REV. 875, 875–98 (2021).
29
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10.
26
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should increase, but the employee win rate should decline. They explain that as compensatory
damages in employment discrimination cases are based on back pay, and because back pay is
contingent upon the duration of plaintiffs’ unemployment (which rises during a recessionary
economy), average monetary awards should rise during recessionary periods. This seems
plausible as terminated employees on average search longer for new jobs during a financial
crisis which is a period characterized by high unemployment. 30 The employee win rate,
however, is expected to fall because the prospects of greater awards would encourage many
employees with less meritorious discrimination allegations to file their claims as well. Donohue
and Siegelman call this whole phenomenon the Worker Benefits Effect.31
Keeping in mind the characteristics of arbitration, the Worker Benefits Effect is not
expected to influence arbitration outcomes. Being an efficient system, average arbitration case
durations are not expected to increase during recessions. 32 Therefore, backpay, and hence,
award amounts are expected to not rise during the GFC. However, the employee win rate, just
like in litigation, is expected to fall during the GFC. As explained earlier, aggrieved employees
with strong cases are expected to strategically decide to file lawsuits because courts are known
to award high compensatory damages during recessions. 33 This would leave arbitration with
less meritorious cases, lowering the employee win rate in arbitration. Hence, the second
hypothesis is that compared to the periods before and after the GFC, the employee win rate for
discrimination arbitration cases significantly decreased during the GFC. The third hypothesis
is that the award amounts (for winning employee-plaintiffs) do not change during the GFC
period.
3.

DATA AND METHODS

The data consist of the universe of employment arbitration disputes resolved under
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) covering a period of 19 years (19992017). Data on cases filed between January 1999 – December 2007 were received as a
compiled dataset from FINRA itself. This dataset contained 1,627 employment arbitration cases
with information on individual case characteristics. Variables included information regarding
names of disputants, name of counsels, name of arbitrators, filing date, issuing date, total
amount claimed by plaintiffs, damages awarded, etc. All this information is also published in
the award sheet of every case decided under the FINRA arbitration program – it is publicly
available on the FINRA website. This online source is used to extract information for all the
employment arbitration cases filed after December 2007 up till December 2017. The final and
updated version of the FINRA dataset contained 3,207 cases.
Drawing from Lamare and Lipsky’s methodology, these 3,207 cases were separated
into three different allegation types34. The first category includes all cases that contained
statutory discrimination claims – employees filing charges that rested upon Title VII of the

30

Griffin, supra note 17, at 750–51.
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 712.
32
Klaus P. Berger, The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis: Why Arbitration Makes Sense for Banks and Financial
Institutions, L. 3(1) FIN. MKT. REV. 54, 54–63 (2009).
33
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 712.
34
Lamare & Lipsky, supra note 5, at 159.
31
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Civil Rights Act fall into this group. It must be noted here that some complaints had multiple
allegations; for such cases, if the nature of suit included discriminatory language, it is coded as
a discrimination case because the additional charges were mostly just extensions of the
discrimination allegation. The second category has all statutory cases that are nondiscriminatory in nature – all cases that include allegations based on federal and/or state laws
except Title VII fall into this group (i.e., Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), etc.). The third category consists of the remainder
cases that comprise of all non-statutory complaints that have nothing to do with statutory laws
(i.e., defamation, breach of written contract, etc.).
All cases are categorized into these three different types primarily because statutory
claims, and especially discrimination claims, have characteristics that differ from other types
of allegations. For example, discrimination claims are more complex, 35 and are more grievous
compared to non-statutory claims36. Moreover, as explained earlier, discrimination cases are
the only types of claims that the securities industry allows to be resolved using voluntary
arbitration. All non-discrimination cases are required to go into mandatory arbitration.
The final dataset also includes information regarding individual case and party
characteristics – they are used as control variables and are listed below:
Case characteristics:
the dollar amount claimed by employee plaintiffs
number of hearing sessions
dates of filing and resolution of the case which produced the
variable case duration
a binary measure of whether punitive damages were claimed
a binary measure of whether the employee plaintiff requested
expungement for his/her disciplinary record from the Central
Registration Depository (CRD)
a binary measure signifying whether a case was settled before an
arbitrator decision was made
a binary measure of whether the defendant-employer filed a
motion to dismiss the case; a binary measure of whether the
defendant-firm filed a motion for summary judgment
a binary measure used to signify cases in which an arbitrator
dissented with the opinion of the majority panel.

35

See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120(4) YALE L. J. 728, 728–812.
See generally Anna Maria Marshall, Idle Rights: Employees’ Rights Consciousness and the Construction of
Sexual Harassment Policies, 39(1) L. & SOC’Y REV. 83, 83–123 (2005).
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Party characteristics:
repeat employer
repeat chair-arbitrator
repeat employer-chair arbitrator pairings
chair-arbitrator professionalization; employee gender
chair-arbitrator gender
a binary measure for employee representation and employer
representation, separately.
Previous empirical analyses of the FINRA data use these same measures as control
variables37.
The independent variable is the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which is a categorical
measure of the pre-GFC, during the GFC, and post-GFC periods. The most common approach
for determining a crisis period is to use critical event dates. 38 There were two key events that
signify the beginning of the GFC. 39 First key event was the collapse of Bear Stearns when it
was bought by J.P. Morgan Chase on March 16, 2008. The second event was when Lehman
Brothers declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. The midpoint of these two dates is used
as the starting date for the GFC (i.e., June 15, 2008). The ending date for the GFC is popularly
marked by the relaunching and disbursing of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) in U.S. financial markets which is March 25, 2009.40
To address the issue of capturing disputes that arose during the GFC, a time lag is
introduced. Literature on employment litigation uses a time lag of 10 months: 1 month is
dedicated to retaining a lawyer, 2 months for waiting in the state agency before EEOC begins
to process the complaint, 6 months for EEOC processing, and then 1 month to draft and file a
court complaint.41 As there is no EEOC-like body in arbitration, the 8 months lag attributed to
the state agency and EEOC is not included. However, it is taken into account that some disputes
go through internal grievance procedures like mediation which may consume some time before
a case reaches arbitration. Hence, a total lag of four months is used. In conclusion, the pre-GFC
category included all cases filed up till October 14, 2008 (4 months beyond June 15, 2008); the
during-GFC category included case filed between October 15, 2008 and July 25, 2009; the
post-GFC category included the remaining cases till 2017.
The first hypothesis, that the GFC period saw a decrease in discrimination claims filed
in arbitration, is tested by examining how the percentage of discrimination cases changed after
37

Lamare & Lipsky, supra note 2; see also J. Ryan Lamare, The Devil is in the Details: Attorney Effects on
Employment Arbitration Outcomes, 73(2) ILR REV. 456, 466 (2019).
38
See generally K.J. Forbes & Roberto Rigobon, No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market
Comovements, 57(5) J. FINANCE 2223 (2002).
39
See U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011).
40
Riadh Aloui, Mohamed Safouane Ben Aïssa, & Duc Khuong Nguyen, Global Financial Crisis, Extreme
Interdependences, and Contagion Effects: The Role of Economic Structure, 35(1) J. BANKING & FIN. 130, 131
(2010).
41
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 735–36.
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the GFC hit the U.S. economy. In order to complement this analysis and derive meaningful
interpretations from the findings, data on litigated cases is also examined. Litigation data is
sourced from Bloomberg Law: for all firms that had an employment discrimination claim filed
against them in arbitration after 2004, discrimination cases that were filed against them in the
courts are identified. This sampling methodology does ignore firms that do not have arbitration
cases but might have had litigation cases. Hence, the litigation data does not represent the
universe of employment lawsuits filed against all firms regulated by FINRA. However, the
sample still provides a good estimate of how number of cases compare with arbitration.
Moreover, this sampling limitation would only be an issue if the results show that litigation
cases are lower than arbitration. It must also be noted here that only closed litigation cases are
included as that is what the arbitration data consists of. Also, following Donohue and
Siegelman, a 10-month time lag is used to examine how litigation caseloads varied due to the
GFC.42
To conduct further analyses, the dependent variables (outcomes of arbitration awards)
are developed. Following popular ADR research, outcomes are measured in two ways. First is
a continuous variable presenting the absolute dollar amount awarded to the employee-plaintiff
(U.S. dollars in 1000s). The second is a dichotomous variable signifying a win for the employee
plaintiff if s/he received an award above zero.
A regression framework is employed to test the second and third hypotheses. To
examine whether the employee win rate decreases for discrimination arbitration cases during
the GFC, a linear probability model is used. An interaction term allegation type x GFC, which
signifies the difference in win rates for discrimination cases in the three separate time periods
is included. All regression models include year and location (state-based) fixed effects. For the
third hypothesis regarding whether the award amounts change for discrimination arbitration
cases during the GFC, ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used. Once again, an
interaction term allegation type x GFC is included to compare how discrimination claims
compared to other types of allegations during the three periods. Table 1 lists the variables used
in the analysis along with their summary statistics, by allegation type.
Table 1: Summary Statistics by Allegation Type

Variables

Discrimination
cases

Other statutory
cases

Non-statutory
cases

(N = 318)

(N = 535)

(N = 2,354)

Case characteristics
Total amount claimed (median)

$605,498

$426,321

$172,251

7.0

6.0

4.0

548.0

517.0

432.0

Presence of dissent (% of observations)

5.3

4.7

2.1

Punitive damages (% of observations)

47.8

37.4

33.0

Request for record expungement (% of observations)

38.1

33.5

50.1

Number of hearing sessions (median)
Case duration in days (median)

42

Id.
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Motion to dismiss (% of observations)

36.8

28.0

22.9

Full or partial settlement (% of observations)

9.7

10.8

12.7

26.5

6.0

6.0

15.1

5.2

5.6

Chair arbitrator is a lawyer (% of observations)

74.5

68.4

61.3

Chair arbitrator experience (mean number of cases)

2.0

1.0

1.0

Chair arbitrator is male (% of observations)

79.9

76.5

80.3

Employee is male (% of observations)

65.7

88.4

86.0

Employee has a lawyer (% of observations)

84.0

94.8

74.4

Employer has a lawyer (% of observations)

99.4

98.9

97.2

36.8

56.6

48.3

$96,475

$70,024

$20,995

Party characteristics
Employer experience (median number of cases)
Employer–arbitrator
observations)

are

familiar

(%

of

Outcomes
Finding of merit (% of observations)
Total amount awarded (median)

4.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

The first hypothesis is tested using two different ways, each presented in Table 2a and
2b. Table 2a shows the monthly average of cases in the pre-, during, and post-GFC periods.
Percentage change between these periods shows that compared to the monthly average of
arbitration discrimination cases filed before the GFC, the monthly average of cases filed during
the GFC period decreased by 32.17%. Moreover, examining the time after the GFC occurred
(including the 9 months of the GFC), it is found that the monthly average of cases filed
decreased by 42.97%. To compare results across allegation types, Table 2a also shows the same
percentage change calculations for other non-discrimination statutory and non-statutory cases
filed in arbitration; in comparison to discrimination cases, non-discrimination statutory cases
did not decrease as much. Non-statutory cases, on the other hand, increased by 20.58% during
the GFC.
To complement these findings and enrich interpretations of them, arbitration results
are compared with the monthly average of litigation discrimination cases filed in these periods.
To reiterate, the litigation data does not have the universe of discrimination cases filed (and
resolved) against all FINRA regulated firms – it only includes cases that were brought against
the firms that have had at least one discrimination arbitration case filed against them during
2004-2017. Nonetheless, this data does serve as a meaningful proxy for caseloads in litigation43.
43

Not having the universe of lawsuits does not negatively affect the analysis because the data understates the
number of cases – the universe of discrimination lawsuits filed by securities employees would obviously have
more cases compared to what the dataset consists of. Hence, the findings (in effect) present a conservative
difference in number of cases between the two forums.
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Using these litigation cases, it can be seen that the monthly average of discrimination litigation
cases filed during the GFC period increased by 51.20% (whereas arbitration decreased by
32.17%). And the monthly average of litigation cases filed after the GFC occurred (including
the 9 months of the GFC) increased by 26.80% (whereas arbitration decreased by 42.97%).
Furthermore, the overall number of discrimination cases filed in both forums are also calculated
– the number of cases filed between pre- and during-GFC increased by 26.52%. This implies
that discrimination cases generally rose during the GFC and that majority of the cases were
taken to courts. Moreover, the change in total number of cases between pre- and post-GFC
(including the GFC period) only shows a 3.52% increase. This means that the overall number
of discrimination cases filed did not increase post-GFC; but employees generally increased
their liking and maintained their taste for litigation after the GFC hit.
Table 2a: Percentage change in number of arbitration claims filed Pre-, During, and Post-GFC

Item
Pre-GFC
(Jan-99 to

Arbitration
Discrimination
Cases

Arbitration
Other
statutory
Cases

Arbitration
Nonstatutory
cases

Litigation
Discrimination
Cases

Total
Discrimination
Cases
(Arb + Lit)

1.77

2.66

10.62

2.38

3.87

1.20

2.20

12.80

3.60

4.90

1.01

2.05

10.10

3.02

4.01

-32.17

-17.23

+20.58

+51.20

+26.52

-42.97

-23.06

-4.86

+26.80

+3.52

Sep-08)
During
GFC (Oct08 to Jun09)
During and
Post-GFC
(Oct-08 to
Dec-17)
Percentage
change
between
Pre-GFC
and During
GFC
Percentage
change
between
Pre-GFC
and PostGFC
(including
GFC
period)
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Notes: The pre-GFC period for litigation only includes cases from Jan 2004 to Aug 2008 instead
of Jan 1999 to Aug 2008.
Table 2b: Percentage change in number of arbitration claims between 10-month period
averages
Arbitration

Arbitration

Other

Non-

statutory
Cases

statutory
cases

13.67

22.33

109.00

24.67

31.00

12.00

22.00

128.00

25.00

37.00

11.67

22.67

121.00

31.33

42.33

-12.20

-1.49

+17.43

+1.35

+19.35

-14.63

+1.49

+11.01

+27.03

+36.56

Arbitration
Discrimination
Cases

Item
Average of three
10-month
periods
GFC

before

Number of cases
in the 10-month
GFC period

Litigation
Discrimination
Cases

Total
Discrimination
Cases
(Arb + Lit)

Average of three
10-month
periods
after
GFC (including
GFC)
Percentage
change between
and
Pre-GFC
GFC period
Percentage
change between
3-years Pre-GFC
and 3-years PostGFC (including
GFC period)

Table 2b supports and verifies the results of Table 2a. Table 2b shows that about
twelve discrimination arbitration cases were filed during the 10-month GFC period (October
08 – July 09). An average of 13.67 cases were filed in the three 10-month periods (October to
July) for the three years right before the GFC. And an average of 11.67 cases were filed in the
three 10-month periods for the three years after the GFC occurred (including the GFC period).
Calculating the percentage change between these periods shows that the average number of
discrimination arbitration cases filed decreased by 12.20% during the GFC, and 14.63% after
the GFC occurred (including the 10 months of the GFC period). Moreover, compared to
discrimination cases filed in arbitration, other statutory and non-statutory cases increased. The
litigated discrimination cases also increased by a considerable 27.03% post-GFC (including the
GFC period). All these results evidently support the hypothesis that discrimination case filed in
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arbitration substantially decreased and discrimination cases filed in litigation substantially
increased after the GFC hit the U.S. economy
Table 3: Regression Results for the Effect of GFC on Outcomes

Variables

Win rates
(all cases)

Absolute awards
(meritorious only)

Coefficient
(S.E.)

Coefficient
(S.E.)

Allegation type and GFC
Interaction terms:
Discrimination allegation before GFC
Discrimination allegation during GFC
Discrimination allegation after GFC

0.220**

2368.684**

(0.105)

(119.696)

(ref)

(ref)

0.316***
(0.110)

367.322***
(149.378)

0.084

-190.745

(0.118)

(233.796)

(ref)

(ref)

0.059
(0.125)

-237.525
(212.511)

Discrimination allegation

-0.344***
(0.102)

-308.328**
(119.368)

Other statutory allegation

-0.028
(0.117)

217.751
(221.953)

Non-statutory allegation

(ref)

(ref)

Before GFC

0.049
(0.085)

141.101
(141.896)

During GFC

(ref)

(ref)

-0.145
(0.067)

-85.395
(47.128)

Other statutory allegation before GFC
Other statutory allegation during GFC
Other statutory allegation after GFC

Allegation type:

Global Financial Crisis (GFC):

After GFC

Case characteristics
Total amount claimed
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(0.000)

(0.010)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.008***
(0.001)

15.282***
(4.172)

Case duration

0.000
(0.000)

-0.025
(0.059)

Presence of dissent

0.108**
(0.055)

38.098
(106.533)

Punitive damages

-0.037**
(0.018)

50.614
(33.318)

Request for record expungement

-0.031*
(0.017)

-65.414**
(28.418)

-0.101***
(0.020)

5.950
(30.224)

0.075**
(0.032)

-71.358***
(25.638)

Claim squared
Number of hearing sessions

Motion to dismiss
Full or partial settlement

Party characteristics
Repeat employer (number of cases)

0.001***
(0.000)

0.013
(0.134)

Repeat employer–chair arbitrator (number of cases)

-0.077***
(0.025)

-46.314
(30.759)

-0.027

-32.258

(0.017)

(22.026)

Chair arbitrator experience

-0.002
(0.005)

0.999
(5.553)

Chair arbitrator is male

0.028
(0.020)

-23.742
(26.837)

Chair arbitrator is a lawyer

0.015

-16.716

(0.022)

(52.026)

Employee has a lawyer

0.119***
(0.024)

87.091***
(19.577)

Employer has a lawyer

-0.166***
(0.057)

35.555
(28.289)

N

3,207

1557

Model Type

LPM

OLS

Employee is male

Notes: All models include year and location (state-based) fixed effects. Robust
standard errors are clustered by employer. Award and claim amounts are deflated to 1991
dollars.
Statistically significant at the *** .01; ** .05; or * .10 level.
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Table 3 provides results for the second hypothesis that tests whether the employee
win rate decreases for discrimination arbitration cases during the GFC. The regression analysis
shows that relative to the GFC period and other allegation types, discrimination cases had a
significantly higher win rate before (p < 0.05) and after (p < 0.01) the GFC. Figure 1 shows the
margins plot for this result – compared to statutory non-discrimination and non-statutory cases,
predicted win rate for discrimination cases faced a significant dip during the GFC period.
Figure 1: Marginal effects of allegation types on employee win rate pre-, during, and
post-GFC

Results also support the third hypothesis by showing that the award amounts
(victorious employee-plaintiffs) for discrimination allegations drops during the GFC. Relative
to the GFC period and other allegation types, discrimination cases had significantly higher
award amounts before (p < 0.05) and after (p < 0.01) the GFC. Figure 2 shows the margins plot
for this result – compared to statutory non-discrimination and non-statutory cases, predicted
award amounts for discrimination cases faced a significant dip during the GFC period. The
expectation was that the Worker Benefits Effect would not play its role in arbitration and so
there would be no change in award amounts during the GFC. However, contrary to what
happens in the litigation arena, the discrimination arbitration award amounts for cases filed by
employee-plaintiffs during the GFC decrease in magnitude.
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Figure 2: Marginal effects of allegation types on award amounts pre-, during, and
post-GFC

5.

DISCUSSION

Crises and uncertainties at a macro-level are known to affect employees’ workplace
experiences.44 The results, consistent with other studies, show that the Global Financial Crisis
2008-09 influenced employees in a way that they filed a higher number of discrimination cases
against their employers during the GFC. This provides support for Bornstein’s and Griffin’s
findings that irrespective of whether discriminatory behavior increases or not, the number of
discrimination cases filed certainly increase when a recession occurs. 45. This increase in
complaints, however, is not reflected in arbitration cases. Out of the two available forums that
can be used to resolve discrimination disputes in the securities industry, arbitration cases
decrease whereas litigation cases increase. This clearly indicates that during a recession,
disputant parties prefer to use litigation to resolve their discrimination complaints. Results also
show that arbitration yields adverse outcomes for employees during the GFC. Compared to the
periods before the GFC and after GFC, the GFC period is characterized with a decline in both,
employee win rate and award amounts.
These employee-unfriendly findings regarding the usage and outcomes of arbitration
during the GFC can be interpreted as follows. Discrimination claims are serious allegations –
if proven, they cost defendant firms a lot of money; moreover, firms are strategic actors and

44
See generally Stephan Zagelmeyer & Paul J. Gollan, Exploring Terra Incognita: Preliminary Reflections on
the Impact of the Global Financial Crisis upon Human Resource Management, 23(16) THE INT’L J. HUM. RES.
MGMT. 3287–94 (2012).
45
Bornstein, supra note 6; see also Griffin, supra note 17.
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they try to avoid dispute resolution costs.46 Hence, it would be safe to assume that many highstake claims are settled within internal grievance procedures before they reach arbitration or
litigation.47 Some weak cases can also get settled in such pre-trial stages because employees
avoid taking the risk of losing their weak cases in binding forums. This is truer for recessionary
periods because employers can especially win weak cases by simply denying claims of
discrimination and alleging that they laid off an employee due to the financial crisis, and not
due to any discrimination. A leading plaintiff lawyer Douglas Wigdor explains this by
mentioning firms ‘using the recession as a pretext for their discriminatory behavior’48.
The disputes that do not get resolved in internal grievance procedures are more likely
to be serious claims in which both, employee-plaintiffs and defendant-employers and their
respective attorneys, believe they have a very strong and meritorious claim. Schwartz calls such
cases high-cost/high-stake claims. At this point, employees decide the forum based on which
avenue will provide them with the highest net benefit. As literature shows higher award
amounts for employment discrimination lawsuits during recessions,49 and findings from our
research show that arbitration award amounts significantly decline during a recession, it makes
logical sense for employees to take their high merit claims into courts instead of arbitration.
Schwartz directly explains that it makes theoretical sense to take high-cost/high-stake cases into
courts as litigating them increases the chances of high settlements or higher awards as
verdicts50.
Nonetheless, as the data shows, there still are cases that end up being arbitrated during
the GFC. These cases probably have smaller claims and lower stakes compared to the ones that
get filed in courts – it does not make economic sense for employees (and employers) to litigate
low-value claims because the cost associated with litigation may be a lot more than the expected
outcome.51 Therefore, it is possible that the unfavorable outcomes in arbitration during the GFC
are due to a natural selection of comparatively less meritorious discrimination claims.
Moreover, employee-plaintiffs who do not have the resources to use litigation, or plaintiffs who
are not as confident about the merits of their claim and are not able to find a counsel, are also
theoretically more likely to decide to use an inexpensive and less complicated arbitration
system. Such employees compromise on the potentially high return litigation might have
provided for a quick and cost-effective arbitration encounter. However, as results show,
employees using arbitration to resolve their discrimination claims during the GFC end up with
poor outcomes in the form of lower award amounts and lower win rate.
The lower employee win rate is also explained by the lower award amounts. The poor
prospects of receiving high awards in arbitration can be an important factor leading employee-

46

David B. Lipsky, Ariel C. Avgar, & Ryan Lamare, Organizational Conflict Resolution and Strategic Choice:
Evidence from a survey of Fortune 1000 Firms, 73(2) ILR REV. 431, 444 (2019).
47
David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher, & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New
Path for Empirical Research, 57(5) STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1565–66 (2005).
48
See generally How the Pandemic Has Impacted Conflict Resolution, ILR SCHEINMAN INSTITUTE,
https://www.ilr.cornell.edu/scheinman-institute/practice/pandemics-impact-on-conflict-resolution (last visited
Jan. 5, 2022) (second video titled “How the Pandemic Impacts Plaintiff Attorneys, With Douglas Wigdor).
49
Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10, at 712.
50
See generally Schwartz, supra note 22.
51
Susan Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over Pre-Dispute Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 16(3) OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 562 (2001) (It is not possible to ascertain whether arbitration
cases have lower claim amounts because litigation cases generally do not include information on claim amounts.).
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plaintiffs, especially with meritorious claims, to choose litigation. This leaves arbitration with
weaker and less meritorious cases which then lowers the employee win rate. Moreover, as
mentioned earlier, due to the arduousness of proving discrimination allegations, and because
the burden of proof is on employees, employee-plaintiffs would be even less likely to win their
discrimination claims during the GFC: firms would use the recession as a strong weapon to
extinguish employees’ claims. This however would be true for litigated discrimination claims
as well; and that is one of the reasons why the literature shows a low employee win rate in
litigation.52
There could be other possible explanations for these findings. The decline in
arbitration cases may also be due to the fact that the securities industry does not allow class
action claims to be arbitrated.53 As recessions induce large-scale layoffs,54 it sometimes makes
more sense for employees to file class actions instead of individual claims. With FINRA barring
class actions, a lot of employees might have left the arbitration forum for litigation resulting in
a decline in its caseload.
Another reason for not seeing a rise in arbitration cases during the GFC may be
because most of the layoffs (which is the most common result of discrimination) and other such
employment concerns surfacing during recessions, are not filed as discrimination cases. As
employees and their attorneys are aware that defendant firms might refuse any discrimination
allegation and get away with blaming the economy for a layoff, it may make more strategic
sense for employee-plaintiffs to file non-statutory claims in arbitration. This would especially
make sense for employees who are not confident about their discrimination claim but still want
justice for an alleged wrongdoing by their employers. An example of such a claim would be
wrongful termination which is covered under the non-statutory contractual domain of FINRA
arbitration. Results support this idea as the non-statutory arbitration claims drastically increased
during and after the GFC occurred.
Another explanation regarding the lower award amounts in arbitration, though less
plausible, may be that arbitrators might be mindful of firms being financially troubled during
the recession and therefore award comparatively lower damages. 55 This sympathetic view can
be found to play its role in litigation.56 However, it is also true that award amounts increase in
litigation.
6.

CONCLUSION

This paper analyzes how the usage and outcomes of employment arbitration varies
during an economic recession. Using data from the securities industry arbitration system
(FINRA), it is found that the overall number of discrimination cases filed by employees
increased during the Global Financial Crisis 2008-09. However, as aggrieved employees are

52

See generally Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 10.
See FINRA Rule 12204(a) (“class action clause may not be arbitrated under the Code.”).
54
Lipsky, supra note 7, at 7.
55
Sarah Walker, Boey Swee Siang, & Luke Ryan, Arbitration: Recession-proof or Another Casualty of the
Global Credit Crunch?, BIRD & BIRD (Oct. 2020), https://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2010/arbitrationrecession-proof.
56
Penzer & Parvaneh supra note 24.
53
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allowed to voluntarily choose between arbitration and litigation to file their discrimination
claims, arbitration cases considerably decreased whereas litigation cases grew in number. This
may be a function of most high merit cases getting settled in internal grievance procedures; the
remainder of such high-merit and high-stake cases are strategically taken into courts for better
outcomes. Moreover, compared to the period before and after the GFC, arbitration produces a
lower win rate for discrimination cases filed during the GFC. The employee award amount is
also lower for discrimination cases filed during the GFC. As the high-merit/high-cost cases are
most likely selected into litigation, arbitration is left with comparatively low-merit/low-cost
cases which is likely the cause of a lower win rate during the GFC.
All these findings generally cast light on whether arbitration is a desirable forum to
resolve discrimination complaints brought by employee-plaintiffs during a macroeconomic
recession. Arbitration is known to have the requisite characteristics of being efficient and
inexpensive – however, its’ usage and outcomes both dropped during the GFC. These findings
contribute to the understanding of arbitration and how it performs under a macroeconomic
constraint. Arbitration may be a feasible option when the economy is in good shape, but it
seems to be an unfavorable choice during a recession. This may be a cause for concern
regarding the overall expansion of employment arbitration as a dispute resolution function.
Future research on this topic should be conducted by analyzing sectors where
arbitration is not voluntary, such as the education or retail industry. It would be informative to
examine how pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is influenced by a recessionary economy. Do
discrimination cases decline when arbitration is compulsory or do employees avoid using
arbitration even when it is the only option available?
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